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Abstract
An opinion leader-follower model (OLF) is a two-action collective decision-making model
for societies, in which three kinds of actors are considered: opinion leaders, followers, and
independent actors. In OLF the initial decision of the followers can be modified by the influence
of the leaders. Once the final decision is set, a collective decision is taken applying the simple
majority rule [22]. We consider a generalization of OLF, the gOLF models which allow collective
decision taken by rules different from the single majority rule. Inspired in this model we define
two new families of collective decision-making models associated with influence games [15]. We
define the oblivious and non-oblivious influence models. We show that gOLF models are non-
oblivious influence models played on a two layered bipartite influence graph.
Together with OLF models, the satisfaction measure was introduced and studied. We ana-
lyze the computational complexity of the satisfaction measure for gOLF models and the other
collective decision-making models introduced in the paper. We show that computing the satis-
faction measure is #P-hard in all the considered models. On the other hand, we provide two
subfamilies of decision models in which the satisfaction measure can be computed in polynomial
time.
Exploiting the relationship with influence games, we can relate the satisfaction measure with
the Rae index of an associated simple game. The Rae index is closely related to the Banzhaf.
Thus, our results also extend the families of simple games for which computing the Rae index
and the Banzhaf value is computationally hard.
Keywords Collective decision-making model. Opinion leader-follower model. Simple game.
Influence game. Satisfaction measure. Banzhaf value. Computational complexity.
1 Introduction
Opinion leadership is a well known and established model for communication in sociology and
marketing. It comes from the two-step flow of communication theory proposed in the 1940s [13].
This theory recognizes the existence of collective decision-making situations in societies formed by
actors called opinion leaders, who exert influence over other kind of actors called the followers,
resulting in a two-step decision process [13, 10]. In the first step of the process, all actors receive
information from the environment, generating their own decisions; in the second step, a flow of
influence from some actors over others is able to change the choices of some of them [21]. Following
those ideas an opinion leader-follower model (OLF) was introduced in [22]. The subjacent influence
structure is based on a society with opinion leaders, followers and independent actors. This latter
kind of actors neither can influence nor can be influenced by other members of the society. The
collective decision-making model includes a procedure to reach an individual final decision, from a
given initial decision of the participants. Finally, a global decision is taken by applying the single
majority rule to the final decisions of the actors which restricts the society to have an odd number
of participants.
In this paper we are interested in extending OLF models in order to incorporate more complex
scenarios in the decision-making model. In general, simple games are used to formulate the situa-
tions in which the actors or players have to decide about one alternative. Simple games were firstly
introduced in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern [23] and constitute the classic way for such
models. Briefly speaking, a simple game is determined by its winning coalitions, i.e., those sets
of actors that can force a “yes” decision. Nevertheless, the way in which the influence is exerted
among leaders and followers in an OLF suggests that another formalism based on graphs might
provide the necessary insights, so we explore the possibility of defining decision-making models
based on influence games [15]. Influence games are based on social networks that incorporate a
procedure of influence spreading. The winning coalitions are determined depending on the level of
influence that the coalitions can exert in a social network. Influence games are defined through a
more complex graph structure among the actors than the structures of the OLF. Here the society
is modeled by an influence graph and it is assumed that influence spreads according to the linear
threshold model [8, 19, 11]. Influence games are general enough to capture the complete class of
simple games, since every simple game can be represented by an influence game [15]. However, the
size of the graph representing a simple game might be exponential in the number of players.
We first define an extension of the family of OLF, the generalized OLF (gOLF), by allowing,
in the final decision mechanisms, a rule different from the simple majority rule. We introduce
two new kinds of collective decision-making models based on the influence spread mechanism of
influence games. In the oblivious influence models, the initial decision of the followers is not taken
into account and a negative initial decision of the actors is assumed. In the non-oblivious influence
models, the initial decision of the followers is taken into consideration in a similar way as for OLF.
We also consider a subfamily of gOLF, the odd-OLF. This subfamily plays an important role as
it lies in the intersection of oblivious and non-oblivious models. The inclusion relationship among
the introduced models is explained later, but for now it is depicted in Figure 1.
Motivated by the theoretical study of the effects that collective decision-making can have on
the participants, a satisfaction measure was defined for an OLF in van den Brink et al. [22]. The
satisfaction of an actor refers to the number of initial decisions for which the collective decision
coincides with the initial decision of the actor. In this paper we are interested in, besides the
definition of the decision models, the computational complexity of the satisfaction measure. We
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Figure 1: Inclusion relationship between subfamilies of collective decision-making models.
show that the satisfaction problem is #P-hard for odd-OLF. It is interesting to note that the influ-
ence graph corresponding to those models is formed by a simple two layered bipartite graph. Our
hardness proof comes from a reduction from the #23-VC problem, i.e., the problem of computing
the number of vertex covers with exactly 23n vertices. This problem is equivalent to the problem
of counting independent sets of size 13n which was shown to be #P-hard, by a reduction from the
well known #P-complete #3-SAT problem, the counting version of the 3-satisfiability problem [9].
We are also interested in analyzing what are the influence graphs for which the satisfaction
measure can be computed in polynomial time. As the satisfaction problem is hard for two layered
bipartite graphs, there is not much room for finding tractable subfamilies. We explore the possibility
of tractable cases in multilayered bipartite graphs where the connection among consecutive layers
is the disjoint union of complete bipartite graphs. Those structures are able to represent a “more-
than-two-step flow of communication”. In multilayered bipartite graphs we have an additional set
of actors called the mediators. Those actors can be influenced by the opinion leaders and may
influence the followers. Thus we extend OLF models by allowing an intermediate set of actors to
play the role of mediators between leaders and followers. The first family, the strong hierarchical
influence graphs, is formed by layered bipartite graphs in which influence is exerted in an all-to-all
fashion following a hierarchical structure. In this case the mediators are interposed between the
leaders and the followers. In the second family, the star influence graphs, we have only one mediator,
but in this case we allow a two way interaction between the mediator and some opinion leaders,
modeling a natural mediation schema occurring in society. We show for those two subfamilies of
bipartite influence graphs that the satisfaction measure can be computed in polynomial time, for
both the oblivious and non-oblivious associated decision-making models.
Interestingly enough, every collective decision-making model considered in this paper is mono-
tonic and thus can be reinterpreted as a simple game. Under this interpretation, we are able to
show that the satisfaction measure coincides with the Rae index. The Rae index was introduced
by Douglas W. Rae [18] for anonymous games and afterwards it was applied by Dubey and Shap-
ley [6] to simple games. In the context of simple games, Dubey and Shapley [6] established an
affine-linear relation between the Rae index and the Banzhaf value [12], establishing a computa-
tional complexity equivalence among their computation. Thus our results on the complexity of the
satisfaction problem, both positive and negative, apply to the computation of the Rae index and
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the Banzhaf value. Computing the Banzhaf value is polynomial time solvable for simple games
represented by the set of winning coalitions, but is #P-complete for simple games represented by
the set of minimal1 winning coalitions [1]. The problem is also known to be #P-hard for weighted
voting games [5] and influence games [15]. For the case of influence games, the known #P-hardness
result leaves open the question on whether the problem is easy or hard when the influence graph is
restricted to be bipartite. Thus, our results extend the subfamilies of simple games for which the
complexity of the computation of the Banzhaf value is known.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definitions of OLF, the satisfaction
measure, simple and influence games. In Section 3 we introduce the oblivious and non-oblivious
influence models and show some of their basic properties. In Section 4 we prove the hardness of the
satisfaction problem for odd-OLF, which implies hardness for the other three considered models.
Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the definition of strong hierarchical influence graphs and star
influence graphs, respectively, and to the design of algorithms to solve the satisfaction problem
in polynomial time for oblivious and non-oblivious influence models on those graph classes. We
finalize this paper stating some conclusions and open problems.
2 Preliminary concepts
In this section we introduce the necessary definitions and concepts, such as OLF, the satisfaction
measure, simple and influence games. Before stating the definitions, we fix some notation for graphs
and sets.
All the graphs considered in this paper are directed, unless otherwise stated, without loops
and multiple edges. We use standard notation for graphs: G = (V,E) is a directed graph, V (G)
denotes the vertex set, E(G) is the edge set, and n denotes the number of vertices |V |. We use
simply V and E when there is no risk of confusion. For i ∈ V , SG(i) = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}
denotes the set of successors of i, and PG(i) = {j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E} the set of predecessors of i. We
extend this notation to vertex subsets, so for X ⊆ V , SG(X) = {i ∈ V | ∃j ∈ X, i ∈ SG(j)} and
PG(X) = {i ∈ V | ∃j ∈ X, i ∈ PG(j)} denote the set of successors and predecessors of all elements
that belong to X, respectively. Finally, let δ−(i) = |PG(i)| and δ
+(i) = |SG(i)| denote the in-degree
and the out-degree of the vertex i, respectively. A two layered bipartite graph is a bipartite graph
G = (V1, V2, E) with V (G) = V1 ∪ V2 and E ⊆ V1 × V2, i.e., so that for i ∈ V1, PG(i) = ∅ and, for
i ∈ V2, SG(i) = ∅. By Ia, as usual, we denote a graph that is formed by a isolated vertices. Given
G = (V,E) and X ⊆ V , G[X] denotes the subgraph induced by X and G\X denotes the subgraph
induced by V \X, i.e., G \X = G[V \X].
As usual, given a finite set N , P(N) denotes its power set. A family of subsets W ⊆ P(N) is
said to be monotonic when, for X ∈ W, if X ⊆ Z, then Z ∈ W. In some cases we need to establish
a relation between vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n and sets X ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. For doing so, we
use the notation X(x) = {0 ≤ i ≤ n | xi = 1}, and x(X) = (x1, . . . , xn) with xi = 1 if and only if
i ∈ X, and xi = 0 otherwise.
Every collective decision-making model M considered in this paper is (or can be) defined on a
weighted digraph on which a collective decision function is defined. The actors (vertices) initially
can choose among two alternatives, 1 or 0. Given a set of n actors, the initial decision is represented
by an initial decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n. The initial decisions of the actors, due to the interactions
1A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition such that by removing any player we obtain a losing coalition.
A maximal losing coalition is a losing coalition such that by adding any player we obtain a winning coalition.
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among the participants, and according to the model, can change giving rise to a final decision
vector of the actors. We usually denote this final decision vector as cM(x) ∈ {0, 1}n. Finally, the
collective decision function CM : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}, that depends on cM(x), assigns a final decision
to the system. In the following subsections we formally define those vectors and functions for each
of the considered decision-making models. In general, we drop the explicit reference to M when
the model is clear from the context.
Note that the collective decision function is usually defined through a decision process on a
graph. It may include many parameters, therefore its computational complexity might be high.
Nevertheless, the models considered in this paper have their collective decision functions computable
in polynomial time.
2.1 The opinion leader-follower model and the satisfaction measure
The OLF was introduced by van den Brink et al. [22]. As we mention before, the model considers
three kind of actors: opinion leaders, followers and independent actors. We provide a formal
definition of our generalization of OLF.
Definition 1. A generalized opinion leader-follower model (gOLF) is a triple M = (G, r, q) where
G = (V,E) is a two layered bipartite digraph that represents the actors’ relations. The fraction
value r, 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1, is a rational number. The quota q, 0 < q ≤ n, is a natural number. The
collective decision function C is defined as follows. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be an initial decision vector,
then the final decision vector c = cM(x) has the following components, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
ci =


1 if |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = 1}| ≥ ⌈r · |PG(i)|⌉
and |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = 0}| < ⌈r · |PG(i)|⌉
0 if |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = 0}| ≥ ⌈r · |PG(i)|⌉
and |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = 1}| < ⌈r · |PG(i)|⌉
xi otherwise.
Finally, the collective decision function CM : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} is defined as
CM(x) =
{
1 if |{i ∈ V | ci(x) = 1}| ≥ q
0 otherwise.
Note that the values cMi , for i ∈ V , and CM are well defined. In the definition of OLF, n was
required to be odd and q was fixed to (n+ 1)/2 [22].
Observe that the set V can be partitioned into three subsets: the opinion leaders L(G) = {i ∈
V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}, the followers F(G) = {i ∈ V | SG(i) = ∅ and PG(i) 6= ∅} and the
independent actors I(G) = V \ (L(G)∪ F(G)) = {i ∈ V | SG(i) = ∅ and PG(i) = ∅}. We sometimes
will need the set FI(G) = F(G) ∪ I(G). Note that if (i, j) ∈ E then i ∈ L(G) and j ∈ F(G). When
there is no risk of ambiguity, we simply use S(i), P (i), I, L or F omitting the corresponding graph
G. Finally, note also that S(L) = F, P (F) = L and S(I) = P (I) = ∅.
Observe that both opinion leaders and independent actors always keep their own inclinations
in the final decision vector, but a follower may take a final decision different from their own initial
inclination. In particular, for followers with an even number of predecessors, when r = 1/2 every tie
arising in the predecessors’ decision is broken by the follower’s initial decision. Also, the restriction
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Figure 2: A two layered bipartite graph.
1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1 could be replaced by 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, without changing the model, as a follower having
r < 1/2 can be replaced by an independent actor.
Example 1. Figure 2 illustrates a two layered bipartite graph G = (V,E). Let M = (G, 1/2, 3)
be a gOLF. For the initial decision vectors x = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0) and y = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0), we get the
same final decision vector, cM(x) = cM(y) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0), and the same collective decision value,
CM(x) = CM(y) = 1.
Now we define the satisfaction measure. This measure was defined on the set of actors of the
original OLF to compare and contrast different structures of the model [22]. However, the concept
applies to any collective decision-making model.
Definition 2. Let M be a collective decision-making model over a set of n actors. For an initial
decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, an actor i is satisfied when CM(x) = xi. The satisfaction measure of
the actor i corresponds to the number of initial decision vectors for which the actor is satisfied, i.e.,
SatM(i) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}
n | C(x) = xi}|.
Associated to the satisfaction measure, we consider the following computational problem.
Satisfaction
Instance: A collective decision-making model M and an actor i.
Output: SatM(i).
2.2 Simple and influence games
In this subsection we define simple and influence games. In the scenario of simple games, we follow
notation from [20] and for influence games from [15].
Definition 3. A simple game is a tuple Γ = (N,W), where N is a finite set of players and
W ⊆ P(N) is a monotonic family of subsets of N .
The subsets of N are called coalitions, the set N is the grand coalition and each X ∈ W is
a winning coalition. The complement of the family of winning coalitions is the family of losing
coalitions L, i.e., L = P(N) \ W. Any of those set families determine uniquely the game Γ and
constitute one of the usual forms of representation for simple games [20], although the size of the
representation is not, in general, polynomial in the number of players (see also [16]).
In simple game theory, power indices are used to measure the relevance that a player has in the
game. We recall here the definition of two classic power indices, the Banzhaf value [17, 3] and the
Rae index [18].
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Definition 4. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game. The Banzhaf value of player i ∈ N is defined as
BzΓ(i) = |{X ∈ W | X \ {i} /∈ W}|.
The Rae index of player i ∈ N is
RaeΓ(i) = |{X ∈ W | i ∈ X}|+ |{X /∈ W | i /∈ X}|.
Dubey and Shapley [6] (see also [12]) established an affine-linear relation between the Rae index
and the Banzhaf value. Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple game and i ∈ N ,
RaeΓ(i) = 2
n−1 +BzΓ(i). (1)
Note that, for i ∈ N , as BzΓ(i) ≥ 0, RaeΓ(i) ≥ 2
n−1.
Influence games constitute a form of representation of simple games based on graphs. Influence
games are based on the linear threshold model for influence spreading [8, 19, 11] and take into
account the spread of influence phenomenon through social networks. In this setting a coalition
wins if it can induce enough participants to accept the proposal. Before defining influence games
we introduce influence graphs and the activation process by which influence spreads in the network.
Definition 5. An influence graph is a tuple (G, f), where G = (V,E) is a directed graph and f is
a labeling function assigning to any vertex a non-negative rational value.
Let (G, f) be an influence graph and let X ⊆ V . The activation process, with initial activation
X, at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ n, activates a set of vertices F t(X) defined as follows
F 0(X) = X
F t(X) = F t−1(X) ∪ {i ∈ V | |PG(i) ∩ F
t−1(X)| ≥ f(i)}, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
The spread of influence of X in (G, f) is the set F (X) = Fn(X).
Observe that, in the activation process, a new vertex is activated whenever the number of
vertices activated in the previous step pointing to it is greater or equal to its label. Thus, the
labeling function quantifies the number of neighbors that each actor requires to be influenced. By
definition, the activation process is monotonic; therefore, as there are at most n vertices, there may
be a value k < n so that F k(X) = Fn(X). Note also that given an initial activation set X ⊆ V ,
F (X) can be computed in polynomial time.
Example 2. Figure 3 shows the spread of influence in an influence graph starting from the initial
activation set X = {2, 3}. After the first step we have F 1(X) = {1, 2, 3}, and after the second step,
the last one, we have F 2(X) = F (X) = {1, 2, 3, 5}.
Influence games are simple games defined with the help of an influence graph where a coalition
wins if it is able to influence a required number of the network participants.
Definition 6. An influence game is a tuple Γ = (G, f, q,N), where (G, f) is an influence graph
and q is an integer, the quota, with 0 ≤ q ≤ n. The set of players is the set N ⊆ V (G), and
X ⊆ V (G) is a winning coalition if and only if |F (X ∩N)| ≥ q, otherwise X is a losing coalition.
Note that, in an influence game, the set of players N can be a proper subset of the set of vertices
in the graph V . It is easy to see that the set of winning coalitions of an influence game is monotonic,
since for X ⊆ V and i ∈ V , |F (X ∩ N)| ≥ q entails |F ((X ∩ N) ∪ {i})| ≥ q. Therefore influence
games are a subfamily of simple games. Moreover, any simple game admits a representation as
influence game [15].
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Figure 3: Spread of influence (the set of colored vertices) starting from the initial activation X =
{2, 3}.
3 Oblivious and non-oblivious influence models
In this section we introduce two new collective decision-making models and prove some basic
properties relating the different models. Following the definition of gOLF, it seems natural to
consider a collective decision-making model which uses an influence graph to exert influence before
the final decision is taken. In our models the actors are the set of vertices V of an influence graph,
and the collective decision function takes into consideration the spread of influence process running
on it. In such a setting a player represents either some sort of opinion leader or an independent
actor, and a non-player a follower. The main difference is that now players could be convinced of
a change of opinion and take a final decision different from the initial one. This behaviour was not
possible in the gOLF model. Based on this idea, we define two collective decision-making models.
When modeling collective decision models we require that f(i) > 0, for i ∈ V . In other words,
some positive level of influence to adopt an opinion is required. Nevertheless, for technical reasons,
we keep open the possibility of having f(i) = 0 for some actor i in an influence graph.
Definition 7. An oblivious influence model is a collective decision-making modelM = (G, f, q,N),
where (G, f, q,N) is an influence graph with positive labeling function and whose collective decision
function is defined, for x ∈ {0, 1}n, as
CM(x) =
{
1 if |F (X(x) ∩N)| ≥ q
0 if |F (X(x) ∩N)| < q.
Definition 8. A non-oblivious influence model is a collective decision-making modelM = (G, f, q,N)
with positive labeling function whose collective decision function is defined as follows. For x ∈
{0, 1}n, pi(x) = |F (X(x) ∩ N) ∩ P (i)| and qi(x) = |P (i) \ F (X(x) ∩ N)|. For i ∈ V (G) \ N , we
define the final decision vector c = cM(x) as
ci =


1 if pi(x) ≥ f(i) and qi(x) < f(i)
0 if qi(x) ≥ f(i) and pi(x) < f(i)
xi otherwise
and, for i ∈ N ,
ci =
{
1 if i ∈ F (X(x))
0 otherwise.
Finally, the collective decision function, for x ∈ {0, 1}n, is defined as
CM(x) =
{
1 if |{i ∈ V (G) | ci = 1}| ≥ q
0 otherwise.
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Figure 4: An example of an influence graph.
In order to avoid confusion, for an influence game Γ = (G, f, q,N), we use Mo(Γ) to denote
the corresponding oblivious influence model andMn(Γ) to denote the corresponding non-oblivious
influence model.
Observe that, in an influence game Γ with N = V , for Mn(Γ), we have |{i ∈ V | ci = 1}| =
|{i ∈ V | i ∈ F (X(x))}|, therefore CMo = CMn . In oblivious influence models, as in influence
games, the initial decision of the actors in V \ N is not taken into account and a negative initial
decision is assumed. In non-oblivious influence models, as in OLF, the initial decision of actors in
V \N is taken into account under some considerations.
Example 3. In Figure 4 we provide an influence game (G, f, 3, {2, 3, 4, 5}) in which the mod-
els Mo(Γ) and Mn(Γ) do not coincide. Observe that, for x = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0), CMo(Γ)(x) = 1 but
CMn(Γ)(x) = 0.
Now we analyze some basic properties of both oblivious and non-oblivious influence models.
We start relating some particular decision-making models with simple games.
We say that a decision-making model M is monotonic, on a set of actors V , if its collective
decision function is monotonic with respect to inclusion, on P(V ). For a monotonic model, we
define an associated simple game ΓM in the natural way. A coalition X is winning in ΓM if and
only if CM(x(X)) = 1. Our first results relates the Satisfaction measure and the Rae index.
Lemma 1. Let M be a monotonic decision-making model on a set of actors V . For i ∈ V ,
SatM(i) = RaeΓM(i).
Proof. Recall that, in ΓM, we have W = {X ⊆ V | CM(x(X)) = 1}. Furthermore, for i ∈ V ,
Rae(i) = |{X ∈ W | i ∈ X}| + |{X /∈ W | i /∈ X}|. For i ∈ V and X ⊆ V , we consider four cases.
• If X ∈ W and i ∈ X, then 1 = CM(x(X)) = xi.
• If X ∈ W and i /∈ X, then 1 = CM(x(X)) 6= xi = 0.
• If X /∈ W and i ∈ X, then 0 = CM(x(X)) 6= xi = 1.
• If X /∈ W and i /∈ X, then 0 = CM(x(X)) = xi.
Next we prove that both the oblivious and non-oblivious models associated to an influence game
are monotonic.
Lemma 2. Let Γ = (G, f, q,N) be an influence game. Mo(Γ) and Mn(Γ) are monotonic.
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Proof. Oblivious model. Let M =Mo(Γ). For X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ V , (X ∩N) ⊆ (X ′ ∩N) ⊆ N . Thus, by
the monotonicity of the spread of influence process we know that F (X) ⊆ F (X ′). Thus, we have
CM(X) ≤ CM(X
′).
Non-oblivious model. Let M =Mn(Γ). For X ⊆ V and i 6∈ X, we consider two cases.
• If i ∈ N , then CM(X) ≤ CM(X ∪ {i}) because of the monotonicity of F .
• If i 6∈ N , then (F (X ∩N)∩P (i)) ⊆ (F ((X ∪{i})∩N)∩P (i)). Thus, by the definition of the
collective decision function, we have CM(X) ≤ CM(X ∪ {i}).
In order to relate gOLF with influence games we consider the following construction. Given a
gOLFM = (G, r, q) we associate withM the influence game Γ(M) = (G, f, q,N) where N = L∪I
and the labeling function f is defined as
f(i) =
{⌈
rδ−(i)
⌉
if i ∈ F
1 if i ∈ L ∪ I.
Note that N does not include the set of followers because followers never can enforce their personal
conviction and their final decision depends exclusively on whether the opinion leaders can influence
them or not.
We denote the influence graph (G, f) of the associated influence game Γ(M) as G(M) and by
N(M) the corresponding set of players.
Lemma 3. Let M be a gOLF model and let M′ = Mn(Γ(M)). Then the collective decision
functions of M and M′ coincide.
Proof. Let M′ =Mn(Γ(M)) be the non-oblivious influence model associated with M = (G, r, q).
Let X ⊆ V be a coalition so that x(X) is the initial decision of the actors. Set c = cM(X) and
c′ = cM
′
(X) to be the corresponding final decision vectors. Observe that, for i ∈ L ∪ I, actor i can
not be influenced by any other actor in V ; therefore, i ∈ F (X ∩N) if and only if i ∈ X and ci = c
′
i.
For i ∈ F, {j ∈ P (i) | xj = 1} = F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i). Therefore, ci = c
′
i because the tie-breaking rule
is the same in both models. Thus, we have that CM = CM′ .
As a consequence of the previous result we have a way to map gOLF models to a subfamily of
the non-oblivious influence models. In general, a gOLF cannot be cast as an oblivious influence
model because the tie-breaking rules are different. Nevertheless, we can consider a subfamily in
which ties do not arise.
Definition 9. An odd-OLF is a gOLF M = (G, r, q) in which r = 1/2 and for all i ∈ F, δ−(i) is
odd.
Lemma 4. Let M be an odd-OLF model and let M′ = Mo(Γ(M)). Then the collective decision
functions of M and M′ coincide.
Proof. Let M = (G, 1/2, q) be an odd-OLF, let Γ(M) be the influence game associated with M,
and let X ⊆ V be a coalition so that x(X) is the initial decision of the actors. LetM′ =Mo(Γ(M)).
For i ∈ L ∪ I, Lemma 3 shows that cMi = c
M′
i . For i ∈ F, {j ∈ P (i) | xj = 1} = F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i).
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Figure 5: A two layered bipartite graph G and the influence graph (G, f) corresponding to the
gOLF (G, 1/2, 3).
Since r = 1/2 and δ−(i) is odd, |F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i)| 6= |P (i)| − |F (X ∩N) ∩ P (i)|. Thus, the final
decision vector of the collective decision function does not depend on the follower’s initial decision.
Therefore, there are no ties arising in the predecessors’ decision. So, the oblivious influence model
verifies CM′ = CM.
Note that Lemma 4 is not true for a gOLF where some follower has even in-degree. A counter
example is the OLF M = (G, 1/2, 3), whose graph G and associated influence graph are depicted
in Figure 5.
4 The hardness of computing the satisfaction measure
In this section we show that the Satisfaction problem is #P-hard for odd-OLF. In order to do
so we introduce some notation and define an auxiliary problem.
Let (G, f) be an influence graph. For i ∈ V (G), Fi(G, f) denotes the set {j ∈ SG(i) | |PG(j)| =
1 and f(j) = 1}. For N ⊆ V (G) and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, Fk(N,G, f) denotes the set {X ⊆ V (G) |
|F (X ∩ N)| = k}. When there is no risk of ambiguity, we simply say Fi or Fk(N). Note that
Fk(V ) = {X ⊆ V | |F (X)| = k}. Now we are able to define the auxiliary problem.
Expansion
Instance: An influence graph (G, f), a set of vertices N ⊆ V (G) and an integer k.
Output: |Fk(N,G, f)|.
We sometimes consider that an instance of the Expansion problem is an odd-OLF M = (G, r, q)
by taking G = G(M), N = N(M) and some adequate value for k.
The following results show the relationship among the Satisfaction and the Expansion prob-
lems for some oblivious influence models.
Lemma 5. Let Γ = (G, f, q,N) be an influence game and let Mo(Γ). For i ∈ V (G) \N or i ∈ N
with f(i) = 0, SatMo(i) = 2
n−1.
Proof. Let M = Mo(Γ) = (G, f, q,N), let Z = {i ∈ N | f(i) = 0}. Let x be an initial decision
vector and set X = X(x)∩ (N \Z). Oserve that F (X) = F (X ∪Z) and therefore the final decision
is independent on the initial decision of those players in the set Z.
For i /∈ N or i ∈ Z, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for actor i being satisfied.
We consider two cases:
1. If X ∈ W, CM(x) = 1, and player i is satisfied only when xi = 1.
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2. If X /∈ W, CM(x) = 0, and player i is satisfied only when xi = 0.
Therefore, for an initial decision vector of the players in N \ Z, there is only one way, for player i,
to complete it in such a way that the collective decision coincides with player i’s decision. Thus we
obtain Sat(i) = 2n−1.
In the following result we make use of a particular game construction. Let (G, f, q,N) be an
influence game. Define R(G, f, i) as the influence graph (G′, f ′), where G′ = G[V (G) \ (Fi ∪ {i})],
for j /∈ SG(i), f ′(j) = f(j), and, for j ∈ SG(i), f ′(j) = max{f(j) − 1, 0}.
Lemma 6. Let Γ = (G, f, q,N) be an influence game. For i ∈ N with f(i) > 0 and PG(i) = ∅, we
have that
SatMo(i) = 2
n−1 + 2n−|N |
1+|Fi|∑
j=1
|Fq−j(N \ {i}, R(G, f, i))|.
Proof. Let M = Mo(Γ) = (G, f, q,N), let x be an initial decision vector and set X = X(x) ∩ N .
For i ∈ N with f(i) > 0 and PG(i) = ∅, we provide the conditions for i to be satisfied. We consider
three cases.
1. If X \ {i} ∈ W, then CM(x) = 1, so it must be xi = 1.
2. If X \ {i} /∈ W and X /∈ W, then CM(x) = 0, so it must be xi = 0.
3. If X \ {i} /∈ W and X ∈ W, then CM(x) = 1, so it must be xi = 1.
The first two cases provide a total of 2n−1 initial decision vectors for which the collective decision
coincides with the initial decision of player i. To count the initial decision vectors for the third
case, we consider the influence graph R(G, f, i). We have to separate from the rest those vertices in
the set Fi that can be influenced directly and only by i. Observe that all the vertices in SG(i) \ Fi
have in-degree at least 2. Now, for a coalition Y , it holds that Y ∈ L and Y ∪ {i} ∈ W if and only
if Y ∈ Fq−j(N \ {i}, R(G, f, i)), for some 1 ≤ j ≤ 1 + |Fi|. Therefore, since the influence model
is oblivious, there are 2n−|N |
∑1+|Fi|
j=1 |Fq−j(N \ {i}, R(G, f, i))| additional initial decision vectors z
with zi = CM(z) = 1.
Note that, for i ∈ N with f(i) > 0, PG(i) = SG(i) = ∅ and Fi = ∅,
Sat(i) = 2n−1 + 2n−|N ||Fq−1(N \ {i}, R(G, f, i))|.
Note also that, in odd-OLF models, N = L∪ I, V \N = F, and for i ∈ N , P (i) = ∅. Therefore,
Lemmas 5 and 6 provide the formulas for the satisfaction measure in those models. These results
also show that, as expected, the opinion leaders have always a satisfaction greater than or equal to
that of the independent actors, and that both have always a satisfaction greater or equal than the
followers.
The previous lemma does not provide a formula for the case in which the vertex i ∈ N has
f(i) > 0 and PG(i) 6= ∅. Although this case never occurs in gOLF, it can be handled in other
models by considering another graph construction. Let R2(G, f, i) be the influence graph (G
′′, f ′′),
where V (G′′) = (V (G) \ Fi) ∪ Z, with Z = {z1, . . . z2n} a set of new vertices, and E(G
′′) is formed
by the arcs in G[V (G) \ Fi] and the set {(i, zj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n}. The labeling function is given by
f ′′(j) = f(j), for j ∈ V (G) \ SG(i), by f
′′(j) = max{f(j)− 1, 0}, for j ∈ SG(i), and by f
′′(zj) = 1,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n. The following result can be proved in the same way than Lemma 6, by replacing
R(G, f, i) by R2(G, f, i).
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Figure 6: Influence graph (G1, f1) obtained from an undirected graph G.
Lemma 7. Let (G, f, q,N) be an oblivious influence model, for i ∈ N with f(i) > 0 and PG(i) 6= ∅,
Sat(i) = 2n−1 + 2n−|N |
1+|Fi|∑
j=1
|Fq−j(N \ {i}, R2(G, f, i))|
For our hardness result we consider a variation of the counting vertex cover problem [7]:
#23-VC
Instance: An undirected graph G = (V,E).
Output: Number of vertex covers of G with size 23 |V |, i.e.,∣∣{X ⊆ V | for {i, j} ∈ E, {i, j} ∩X 6= ∅ and |X| = 23 |V |}∣∣.
It is known that the problem of computing in a graph the number of independent sets with size
exactly 13 |V | is #P-hard [9]. Hence, as the complement of an independent set is a vertex cover, the
same result shows that #23-VC is #P-hard.
Theorem 1. The Expansion problem for odd-OLF is #P-hard.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the #23-VC problem. Let G = (V,E) be an instance of #
2
3-
VC. Without loss of generality we assume that G is connected, n = |V | is a multiple of 3 and
n ≥ 6. Let m = |E(G)| and E = {e1, . . . , em}.
We construct a two layered bipartite graph G1 associated to G as follows (see Figure 6 for an
example). The set of vertices is V (G1) = V ∪ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ · · · ∪ En+2 ∪ {z}, where z is a new vertex
and Ej = {e
j
1, . . . , e
j
m}, 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 2, is formed by vertices associated to the edges of E. Observe
that n1 = |V (G1)| = n+ (n + 2)m+ 1. The set of arcs is the following:
E(G1) = {(u, e
j
k) | u ∈ V, 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ m and u ∈ ek}
∪ {(z, a) | a ∈ Ej , 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 2}.
Note that in G1 all the vertices have in-degree either 0 or 3. For the labeling function f1 associated
to the influence graph of the game Γ(G1, 1/2, n1) we have f1(u) = 1, for u ∈ V , f1(z) = 1, and
f1(u) = 2, for u /∈ (V ∪ {z}).
13
Now we define the reduction from #23-VC to Expansion, which associates to G the following
instance h(G) for the Expansion problem:
h(G) =
(
(G1, f1), V ∪ {z},
2
3
n+ (n+ 2)m+ 1
)
.
Let X ⊆ V and let α = |X|. We analyze the expansion of the sets X ∪ {z} and X in the
influence graph (G1, f1).
When the initial activation set is X ∪ {z}, we have two cases, either X is a vertex cover or not.
When X is a vertex cover, all vertices corresponding to edges get activated, so |F (X ∪ {z})| =
α + (n + 2)m + 1. This last quantity is equal to the required size only when α = 23n. When X is
not a vertex cover, then α ≤ n − 2 and at least one edge e ∈ E is not covered. In consequence,
F (X ∪ {z}) can not influence all the vertices in E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En+2. Therefore, |F (X ∪ {z})| ≤
α+ (n + 2)(m − 1) + 2 ≤ n− 2 + (n+ 2)m− (n+ 2) + 2 = (n + 2)m− 2 which is strictly smaller
than the required size.
Now consider the case when the initial activation set is X. Recall that G is connected. If for
{u, v} ∈ E it holds that {u, v} ⊆ X, then we have |F (X ∪ {z})| = n + (n + 2)m, which is greater
than the required size. Otherwise, F (X) can not influence all the vertices in E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En+2, we
have α ≤ n−1, and hence |F (X)| ≤ α+(n+2)(m−1) ≤ n−1+(n+2)m− (n+2) = (n+2)m−3
which is strictly smaller than the required size.
From the previous case analysis, we have that the elements in Fk(V ∪ {z}), for (G1, f1), are
in a one-to-one correspondence with the vertex covers of size 23n in G. As the reduction can be
computed trivially in polynomial time, the claim holds.
The hardness of the Expansion problem does not rule out the possibility of having some
particular cases for which the Expansion problem is computationally easy. For example, when f
is strictly positive and the parameter k of the problem is smaller than the minimum label over the
actors not in N , i.e., k < min{f(i) | i ∈ V \ N}, it is easy to see that, for an oblivious influence
model, |Fk(N)| =
(
n−|N |
k
)
.
Now we can combine the previous results of this section to provide a hardness proof for the
Satisfaction problem.
Theorem 2. The Satisfaction problem for odd-OLF is #P-hard.
Proof. We prove hardness by showing a polynomial time reduction from the Expansion problem
on bipartite influence graphs to the Satisfaction problem. Consider an instance of Expansion
given by a bipartite influence graph (G, f), a set N ⊆ V (G) and an integer k. Let (G′, f ′) be
the influence graph obtained from (G, f) by adding an isolated vertex z with label 1. Finally, we
consider the influence game Γ(G, 2/3, k+1) = (G′, f ′, N ∪{z}, k+1) and the instance (Γ(G, f ′), z)
of the Satisfaction problem.
In order to compute Sat(z) in Γ(G, f), according to Lemma 6 we have to consider the reduced
influence graph R(G′, f ′, z) and the parameter q = k+1. By construction R(G′, f ′, z) = (G, f) and
thus we have
Sat(z) = 2n + 2n+1−|N ||Fk(N, (G, f))|.
Therefore, if we could solve the Satisfaction problem in polynomial time, we would also be able
to solve Expansion in polynomial time.
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Figure 7: A strong hierarchical influence graph.
As a consequence of the previous result and Lemma 4 we have the following.
Corollary 1. The Satisfaction problem for gOLF and the oblivious and non-oblivious influence
models is #P-hard.
As a consequence of the previous result and Lemma 1, the problems of computing the Rae index
and the Banzhaf value are #P-hard for the families of simple games associated to oblivious and
non-oblivious influence models, odd-OLF and gOLF.
5 Strong hierarchical influence models
In this section we focus our attention on one particular topology of the influence graph that provide
oblivious and non-oblivious influence models where the Satisfaction problem is polynomial time
solvable. In the previous section we have shown that the Satisfaction problem is hard for two
layered bipartite graphs. Thus, the potentially tractable subfamilies of influence graphs must
overcome this difficulty by considering stronger or simpler topologies. Our first subfamilies are
based on multilayered bipartite graphs with strong restrictions on the connections among the layers.
In a multilayered bipartite graph, there are some intermediate actors that we called mediators, who
act as intermediate layers of influence expansion between opinion leaders and followers.
The family of graphs is defined recursively using two graph operations. Given two graphsH1 and
H2 with V (H1)∩V (H2) = ∅ their disjoint union is the graph H1+H2 = (V (H1)∪V (H2), E(H1)∪
E(H2)). Given a graph H, the one layer extension to a set V
′ 6= ∅ of new vertices (V (H)∩V ′ = ∅)
is the graph H ⊗ V ′ constructed as follows
V (H ⊗ V ′) =V (H) ∪ V ′ and
E(H ⊗ V ′) =E(H) ∪ {(u, v) | u ∈ FI(H), v ∈ V ′}.
Observe that we have L(H1+H2) = L(H1)∪L(H2), I(H1+H2) = I(H1)∪I(H2), F(H1+H2) =
F(H1) ∪ F(H2) and FI(H1 + H2) = FI(H1) ∪ FI(H2). Furthermore, L(H ⊗ V
′) = L(H) ∪ I(H),
I(H ⊗ V ′) = ∅, and F(H ⊗ V ′) = FI(H ⊗ V ′) = V ′.
As base case we use graphs with only isolated vertices. The family is completed by taking the
closure under the two graph operations defined above.
Definition 10. The family of strong hierarchical graphs is defined recursively as follows.
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• The graph Ia, for a > 0, is a strong hierarchical graph.
• If H1 and H2 are disjoint strong hierarchical graphs, the graph H1+H2 is a strong hierarchical
graph.
• If H is a strong hierarchical graph and V ′ 6= ∅ is a set of vertices with V (H) ∩ V ′ = ∅, the
graph H ⊗ V ′ is a strong hierarchical graph.
A strong hierarchical influence graph is an influence graph (G, f) where G is a strong hierarchical
graph. A strong hierarchical influence game is an influence game (G, f, q,N) where G is a strong
hierarchical graph and N = L(G) ∪ I(G).
In Figure 7 we provide an example of a strong hierarchical influence graph. Observe that
the vertices of a strong hierarchical graph can be partitioned into layers so that edges occur only
between vertices of consecutive layers. Furthermore, by removing the vertices with out-degree
zero in a connected strong hierarchical graph, we obtain a decomposition formed by connected
strong hierarchical graphs and possibly a set of independent vertices. By repeatedly applying this
process we can obtain a decomposition allowing to reconstruct the graph from several independent
sets using disjoint union and adequate layer extensions. The graph G given in Figure 7 can be
decomposed as
[([(H1 ⊗ {4, 5, 6}) + (H2 ⊗ {7, 8})] ⊗ {9, 10}) ⊗ {11}] + [(H3 ⊗ {13, 14}) +H4]
where H1 = ({1, 2}, ∅), H2 = ({3}, ∅), H3 = ({12}, ∅) and H4 = ({15, 16}, ∅).
We start providing an algorithm to solve the Expansion problem for strong hierarchical influ-
ence games. Our algorithm uses dynamic programming and uses the previous decomposition to
guide the computation of some adequate tabulated values.
Lemma 8. Let (G, f, q,N) be a strong hierarchical influence game. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the values
|Fk(N,G, f)| can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let n = |V (G)|, for 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ |FI(G)|, consider the following values
T (a, b):
T (a, b) = |{X ⊆ N | |F (X)| = a and |F (X) ∩ FI(G)| = b}|.
Observe that, if we can compute in polynomial time an array holding all the T (a, b) values, then
we can obtain |Fk(N)| in polynomial time as
|Fk(N)| = 2
n−|N |
∑
0≤b≤|FI(G)|
T (k, b).
Let us show, by induction on the structure of the graph G, how an array storing the desired
values can be obtained from the corresponding arrays for adequate subgraphs. According to Defi-
nition 10, the base case are sets of isolated vertices.
Base case: H = Iα.
In this case all the actors are independent, so |FI(H)| = α and, for X ⊆ V , F (X) = X ∪ {i ∈
V | f(i) = 0}. Therefore, for 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ α, we have
T (a, b) =
{(
α−γ
b−γ
)
2γ if a = b > γ
0 otherwise
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where γ = |{i ∈ V | f(i) = 0}|. All those values can be computed in polynomial time.
The inductive step of the proof is divided into two cases.
Case 1: H = H1 +H2, for some strong hierarchical graphs H1, H2, recall that we also have that
V (H1) ∩ V (H2) = ∅.
Let T1, T2 be the tables corresponding to the graphs H1 and H2, respectively, and let n1 =
|V (H1)| and n2 = |V (H2)|. As the graphs are disjoint, we have the following expression, for
0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ |FI(H)|:
T (a, b) =
∑
a1 + a2 = a
b1 + b2 = b
0 ≤ bi ≤ ai ≤ ni and 0 ≤ bi ≤ |FI(Hi)|, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2
T1(a1, b1)T2(a2, b2).
Those values can be computed in polynomial time using a multiple scanning as follows:
Initialize T (a, b) to 0
for a1 = 0 to n1, a2 = 0 to n2, b1 = 0 to a1, b2 = 0 to a2
T (a1 + a2, b1 + b2) = T (a1 + a2, b1 + b2) + T1(a1, b1)T2(a2, b2).
Case 2: H = H ′⊗V ′ for some strong hierarchical graph H ′ and a set V ′ 6= ∅ with V (H ′)∩V ′ = ∅.
In such a case F(H) = V ′ and the graph H ′ is a strong hierarchical graph with one layer less. Let
T ′ be the array corresponding to the graph H ′. Let n′ = |V (H ′)|, β′ = |FI(H ′)| and β = |FI(H)|.
Recall that, in the construction of H, the arcs added to H ′ connect in an all-to-all fashion the
vertices in FI(H ′) with the vertices in F(H).
To express the values of T we use an auxiliary table R(c), 0 ≤ c ≤ n, defined as
R(c) = |{v ∈ F(H) | f(v) ≤ c}|.
A vector storing the values of R can be computed in polynomial time by sorting the set F(H) in
increasing order of labels and performing a scanning of the sorted table.
We get the following expression, for 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ β:
T (a, b) =
∑
a′ +R(b′) = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ b′ ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ β′
T ′(a′, b′).
Those values can be computed in polynomial time using a double scanning as follows:
Initialize T (a, b) to 0
for 0 ≤ b′ ≤ a′ ≤ n′ , 0 ≤ b′ ≤ β′
T (a′ +R(b′), R(b′)) = T (a′ +R(b′), R(b′)) + T ′(a′, b′).
Note that given a graph, it is possible to know whether it is a strong hierarchical graph in
polynomial time. Moreover, given a strong hierarchical graph it is possible to find a decomposition,
according to the definition, as described above in polynomial time in order to guide the application
of the computation rules in polynomial time.
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It is easy to see that, for a strong hierarchical influence graph (G, f) and an actor i ∈ L(G)∪F(G),
the graph R(G, f, i), constructed as in Lemma 6, is a strong hierarchical influence graph. Therefore,
we can use Lemma 6 together with the previous algorithm to compute Sat(i) in polynomial time.
Thus, we have the following.
Theorem 3. The Satisfaction problem, for oblivious models corresponding to strong hierarchical
influence games, is polynomial time solvable.
Finally we extend the previous computation to the non-oblivious models. In this case we provide
a recursive algorithm that allow us to compute directly the satisfaction measure.
Theorem 4. The Satisfaction problem, for non-oblivious models corresponding to strong hier-
archical influence games, is polynomial time solvable.
Proof. LetM = (G, f, q,N) be an oblivious influence model. Assume that G is a strong hierarchical
graph. We first compute a decomposition of G according to the recursive definition. Recall that
such a decomposition can be obtained in polynomial time.
Given a vertex u, our algorithm to compute Sat(u) computes some tables with partial results,
one for each of the subgraphs in the decomposition of G. Finally, the algorithm combines the
tables corresponding to G to get Sat(u). Observe, the vertex u is present only in a subset of the
graphs appearing in the decomposition of G. We have to compute different kind of information for
a subgraph H when u ∈ V (H) than when v /∈ H. When u ∈ V (H) we have to keep track of u’s
initial decision.
Let n = |V (H)| and M = Mn(H). When u /∈ V (H), we consider the values S(a, b), for
0 ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ |FI(H)|, defined as follows:
S(a, b) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}n | |{i | cMi (x) = 1}| = a and |F (X(x) ∩N) ∩ FI(H)| = b}|.
When u ∈ V (H), we consider two sets of values S0(a, b) and S1(a, b), for 0 ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤
|FI(H)|, defined as
S0(a, b) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}
n | xu = 0
and |{i | cMi (x) = 1}| = a
and |F (X(x) ∩N) ∩ FI(G)| = b}|,
S1(a, b) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}
n | xu = 1
and |{i | cMi (x) = 1}| = a
and |F (X(x) ∩N) ∩ FI(G)| = b}|.
Observe that, if we can compute in polynomial time arrays holding all the S0(a, b) and S1(a, b)
values, for the graph G (which indeed contains u), we can express Sat(u) as
Sat(u) =
∑
0≤a<q
∑
0≤b≤FI(G)
S0(a, b) +
∑
q≤a≤n
∑
0≤b≤FI(G)
S1(a, b).
Thus Sat(u) could be computed in polynomial time.
Let us show, by induction on the structure of the graph G, how an array storing the desired
values can be obtained from the corresponding arrays for adequate subgraphs. Recall that according
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to the definition the labeling function is strictly positive. According to Definition 10, the base case
is a set of isolated vertices.
Base case: H = Iα, for some α > 0.
As all the actors are independent, |FI(H)| = α and, for X ⊆ V , F (X) = X. Furthermore,
cMi = 1 if and only if i ∈ F (X(x)). The expressions are similar to those of the base case for the
expansion problem when γ = 0. Therefore, for 0 ≤ a ≤ α and 0 ≤ b ≤ α, when u /∈ V (H), we have
the expression
S(a, b) =
{(
α
b
)
if a = b,
0 otherwise.
When u ∈ V (H), we have to derive expressions for the two cases. Observe that, if xu = 0, u does
not form part of the initial X, so we can select vertices from V \ {u}. If xu = 1, u must be part of
any X, so we have to select one vertex less. Therefore, we have
S0(a, b) =
{(
α−1
b
)
if a = b,
0 otherwise,
and
S1(a, b) =
{(
α−1
b−1
)
if a = b,
0 otherwise.
Note that all those values can be computed in polynomial time.
Case 1: H = H1 +H2, for some disjoint strong hierarchical influence graphs, therefore V (H1) ∩
V (H2) = ∅.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let ni = |V (Hi)|, βi = FI(Hi), and let S
i, Si0, S
i
1 be the tables corresponding to
the graph Hi. Finally, set β = β1+β2. As the graphs are disjoint,for 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ β,
when u /∈ V (H), we have the following expression
S(a, b) =
∑
a1 + a2 = a
b1 + b2 = b
0 ≤ ai ≤ ni and 0 ≤ bi ≤ βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2
S1(a1, b1)S
2(a2, b2).
When u ∈ V (H) we assume w.l.o.g. that u ∈ V (G1) and we have
S0(a, b) =
∑
a1 + a2 = a
b1 + b2 = b
0 ≤ ai ≤ ni and 0 ≤ bi ≤ βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2
S10(a1, b1)S
2(a2, b2)
and
S1(a, b) =
∑
a1 + a2 = a
b1 + b2 = b
0 ≤ ai ≤ ni and 0 ≤ bi ≤ βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2
S11(a1, b1)S
2(a2, b2).
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Those values can be computed in polynomial time using a multiple scanning similar to the one
used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Case 2: H = H ′⊗V ′, for some strong hierarchical graph H and a set V ′ 6= ∅ and V ′ ∩V (H ′) = ∅.
In such a case F(G) = V ′. Let S′, S′1 and S
′
2 be the arrays corresponding toH
′. Let n′ = |V (H ′)|,
α = |FI(H ′)| and β = |FI(H)|. Recall that, in the construction of G, the arcs added to G′ connect
in an all-to-all fashion the vertices in FI(H ′) with the vertices in F(H).
To express the values of S, S0 and S1 we use, as before, an auxiliary table R(c), 0 ≤ c ≤ α,
defined as
R(c) = |{v ∈ F(G) | f(v) ≤ c}|
which can be computed in polynomial time. Note that R(c) accounts for the number of actors in
the added layer when c followers of G′ are influenced.
We need also information for other relevant sets. For 0 ≤ c ≤ α, define
A1(c) = {v ∈ F(H) | f(v) ≤ c and α− c < f(v)},
A2(c) = {v ∈ F(H) | f(v) ≤ α− c and c < f(v)},
A3(c) = F(H)−A1(c) −A2(c).
Finally set R1(c) = |A1(c)|, R2(c) = |A2(c)| and R3(c) = |A3(c)|. All those sets and values can be
precomputed, for any possible value of c, in polynomial time.
As the connection to the final layer is complete and f is positive, for a set X ⊆ FI(H ′), we have
F (X) = X ∪ {u ∈ F(H) | |X| ≥ f(u)}. Using this information, we know that a subset of opinion
leaders X ⊆ L(H) with γ = |F (X)∩FI(H ′)| will expand its influence to all the followers i for which
f(i) ≤ γ.
For an initial decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, let γ(x) = |F (X(x) ∩ L(H)) ∩ FI(H ′)|. Observe that
the associated final decision vector, for i ∈ F(G), can be expressed as
cMi (x) =


1 if γ(x) ≥ f(i) and α− γ(x) < f(i)
0 if α− γ(x) ≥ f(i) and γ(x) < f(i)
xi otherwise.
=


1 if i ∈ A1(γ(x)),
0 if i ∈ A2(γ(x)),
xi if i ∈ A3(γ(x)).
Taking into account the last expression, we can count those initial decision vectors giving raise to
the prescribed number of 1’s in the final decision vector. We get the following expressions.
When u /∈ V (H), we have that, for 0 ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ β,
S(a, b) =
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ ≤ R3(b
′)
S′(a′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′).
When u ∈ V (H) we have two cases.
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If u ∈ V (H ′), for 0 ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ β,
S0(a, b) =
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ ≤ R3(b
′)
S′0(a
′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′)
and
S1(a, b) =
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ ≤ R3(b
′)
S′1(a
′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′).
If u ∈ V ′ = F(H), for 0 ≤ a ≤ n and 0 ≤ b ≤ β,
S0(a, b) =
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ ≤ R3(b
′)
u /∈ A3(b
′)
S′(a′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′)−1
+
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ < R3(b
′)
u ∈ A3(b
′)
S′(a′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)− 1
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′)
and
S1(a, b) =
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ ≤ R3(b
′)
u /∈ A3(b
′)
S′(a′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′)−1
+
∑
a′ +R1(b
′) + δ + 1 = a
R(b′) = b
0 ≤ a′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ b′ ≤ α
0 ≤ δ < R3(b
′)
u ∈ A3(b
′)
S′(a′, b′)
(
R3(b
′)− 1
δ
)
2R1(b
′)+R2(b′)
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All the required values can be computed in polynomial time using a double scanning similar to
the one used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Thus, the claim holds.
6 Star influence models
Now we consider a family of influence graphs with a star-topology which was previously studied in
the context of influence games [14]. In such a graph the two layered bipartite topology is restricted
to be a star graph and extended by allowing some bidirectional connections to the center of the
star. In a star influence graph, in addition to the sets L, I and F, we have the central node c wich
acts as mediator and the set R of reciprocal actors.
Definition 11. A star influence graph is an influence graph (G, f), where V (G) = L∪I∪R∪{c}∪F
and E(G) = {(u, c) | u ∈ L∪R}∪{(c, v) | v ∈ R∪F}. A star influence game is a game Γ = (G, f, q,N),
where N = L ∪ R ∪ I and (G, f) is a star influence graph.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the labeling function of a star influence game
satisfies f(i) ∈ {0, 1}, for i ∈ V (G) \ {c}. Note that a reciprocal actor with a label greater
than 1 could never be influenced by the mediator, so we remove the arcs from the center to the
actor which becomes an additional opinion leader in the new graph. We can also assume that
f(c) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |L|+ |R|+ 1}.
Lemma 9. Let (G, f, q,N) be a star influence game. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the values |Fk(N,G, f)| can
be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We consider three cases and provide either a closed formula or a recursion allowing to
compute |Fk(N,G, f)| in polynomial time. Let RF = R ∪ F.
Case 1: f(i) > 0, for i ∈ V (G) .
When k < f(c) and X ∈ Fk(N), we know that c /∈ F (X ∩N). Thus, Fk(N) only contains those
sets X with |X ∩ N | = k. When k ≥ f(c), Fk(N) can be divided into two subsets: those with
c /∈ F (X ∩N) and those with c ∈ F (X ∩N). If c /∈ F (X ∩N), we know that F (X) = X and that
|X ∩ (L ∪ R)| < f(c). To fulfill this condition it is enough to take 0 ≤ i ≤ f(c) − 1 vertices from
L∪ R and the remaining k− i vertices from I . If c ∈ F (X ∩N), we know that |X ∩ (L∪ R)| ≥ f(c)
and, therefore, R∪ F∪ {c} ⊆ F (X ∩N). To attain those restrictions, together with F (X ∩N) = k,
we have to take i vertices from L, j vertices from R, for some values of i, j verifying i + j ≥ f(c)
and k − i − (|RF| + 1) ≥ 0, and complete the set with k − i − (|RF| + 1) elements from I. Putting
all together, we have the following expressions.
When k < f(c),
|Fk(N)|
2|F|+1
=
(
|L|+ |R|+ |I|
k
)
When k ≥ f(c),
|Fk(N)|
2|F|+1
=
f(c)−1∑
i=0
(
|L|+ |R|
i
)(
|I|
k − i
)
+
∑
i+j≥f(c)
0≤i≤|L| ,0≤j≤|R|
k−i−(|RF|+1)≥0
(
|L|
i
)(
|R|
j
)(
|I|
k − i− (|RF|+ 1)
)
1 1
1 3 1
1 1 1
Figure 8: A star influence graph.
Case 2: f(c) = 0.
Observe that in this case, for X ⊆ V , F (X ∩ N) = (X ∩ (L ∪ I)) ∪ R ∪ F ∪ {c}. Thus either
k < |RF| + 1 or k ≥ |RF| + 1 . In the first case, there are no sets expanding to k vertices. In the
second, we have to select the adequate number of vertices from L∪ I and any number from R. This
leads to the following expression:
|Fk(N)|
2|F|+1
=


0 if k < |RF|+ 1(
|L|+ |I|
k − (|RF|+ 1)
)
2|R| if k ≥ |RF|+ 1.
Case 3: f(c) > 0 and, for some i ∈ V (G) \ {c}, f(i) = 0.
Let Z1 = {i ∈ I ∪ F | f(i) = 0}, Z2 = {i ∈ L ∪ R | f(i) = 0}, z1 = |Z1| and z2 = |Z2|.
Let X ⊆ V . Observe that, for i ∈ Z1 ∪ Z2, i ∈ F (X ∩ N). Therefore, we can remove those
vertices from the influence graph taking care of reducing the label of c whenever a vertex from Z2
is removed and reducing the size of the required expansion. So, we construct the influence graph
(G′, f ′) where G′ = G \ (Z1 ∪ Z2) and f
′(u) = f(u), for u 6= c, and f ′(c) = max{f(c) − z2, 0}. We
have
|Fk(N,G, f)| = |Fk−z1−z2(N \ (Z1 ∪ Z2), G
′, f ′)|2z1+z2 .
As, only f ′(c) can be zero, the later expression can be computed using the formulas provided in
the previous cases and the claim follows.
It is known that the problem of counting the number of winning or losing coalitions of a given
influence game is #P-complete [15]. The expressions provided in Lemma 9 allow us to count the
number of winning and losing coalitions, for star influence games, in polynomial time, by computing∑n
i=q |Fi(N)| and
∑q−1
i=0 |Fi(N)|, respectively.
Example 4. Consider the star influence graph (G, f) of Figure 8 and the star influence model
(G, f, 4, N). Here |I| = |F| = 1, |R| = 2, |L| = 3 and f(c) = 3. Hence, |W| =
∑8
i=4 |Fi(N)| =
4(0+3+12+13+4) = 128, and |L| =
∑3
i=0 |Fi(N)| = 4(1+6+15+10) = 128. Note that it holds
that |W|+ |L| = 256 = 28, as expected.
In order to solve the Satisfaction problem for star influence models we first show that the
Expansion problem can be solved in polynomial time in a slightly extended family of influence
graphs.
Definition 12. An extended star influence graph is an influence graph that is obtained from a star
influence graph (G′, f ′), by selecting one vertex u ∈ R(G′) and adding a set of vertices Fu with label
1 and the set of edges {(u, v) | v ∈ Fu}. An extended star influence model is an influence model
(G, f, q,N), where (G, f) is an extended star influence graph and N = L ∪ R ∪ I.
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Observe that all the additional vertices attached to a reciprocal actor are followers. By taking
Fu = ∅ we obtain a star influence graph.
Lemma 10. Let (G, f) be an extended star influence graph and let N = L(G) ∪ I(G) ∪ R(G). For
1 ≤ k ≤ N , |Fk(N,G, f)| can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let (G, f) be an extended star influence graph. Let u be the selected vertex in R. Assume
that, for i ∈ V (G), f(i) > 0. Set LR = L ∪ R and RF = R ∪ F.
If k < f(c) and X ∈ Fk(N), we know that c /∈ F (X ∩ N). Therefore, Fk(N) only contains
those sets X with |X ∩ N | = k. If u /∈ X, then F (X ∩ N) = X ∩ N ; but if u ∈ X, then
F (X ∩N) = (X ∩N) ∪ Fu.
On the other hand, if k ≥ f(c), the set Fk(N) can be divided into two subsets, those with
c /∈ F (X ∩ N) and those with c ∈ F (X ∩ N). As in the proof of Lemma 9, when c /∈ F (X ∩N),
we need |X ∩ (L∪ R)| < f(c); but when c ∈ F (X ∩N), R∪ F ∪ Fu ⊆ F (X ∩N). Therefore, we have
the following expressions.
When k < f(c),
|Fk(N)|
2|F|+|Fu|+1
=
(
|LR| − 1 + |I|
k
)
+
(
|LR| − 1 + |I|
k − |Fu| − 1
)
.
When k ≥ f(c),
|Fk(N)|
2|F|+|Fu|+1
=
f(c)−1∑
i=0
[(
|LR| − 1
i
)(
|I|
k − i
)
+
(
|LR| − 1
i
)(
|I|
k − i− |Fu|
)]
+
∑
i+j≥f(c)
0≤i≤|L| ,0≤j≤|R|
k−i−(|RF|+1)≥0
(
|L|
i
)(
|R|
j
)(
|I|
k − i− (|R|+ |F|+ |Fu|+ 1)
)
.
Using this expression, |Fk(N)| can be computed in polynomial time. An argument similar to the
one in the proof of Lemma 9 allows us to devise a polynomial time algorithm to compute |Fk(N)|
when some of the labels are zero.
We transfer the previous results to an algorithm for solving the Satisfaction problem for the
corresponding oblivious models. Note that, for a given star influence model (G, f, q,N), the graphs
R(G, f, i) and R2(G, f, i), as required in Lemmas 6 and 7, are extended star influence graphs. As
a consequence of those results we have the following.
Theorem 5. The Satisfaction problem, for oblivious models corresponding to star influence
games, is polynomial time solvable.
Finally, we show how to solve the Satisfaction problem in non-oblivious models.
Theorem 6. The Satisfaction problem, for non-oblivious models corresponding to star influence
games, is polynomial time solvable.
Proof. Let Γ = (G, f, q,N) be a star influence game. We analyze the differences among participants
in the oblivious Mo and non-obliviousMn associated models. Recall that, for x ∈ {0, 1}n, pi(x) =
|F (X(x) ∩N)∩ P (i)| and qi(x) = |P (i) \ F (X(x) ∩N)| and that the final decision vectors in both
models are defined as follows.
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In the oblivious model, for i ∈ V (G),
cM
o
i =
{
1 if i ∈ F (X(x)),
0 otherwise.
In the non-oblivious model we have two cases, for i ∈ V (G) \N ,
cM
n
i =


1 if pi(x) ≥ f(i) and qi(x) < f(i),
0 if qi(x) ≥ f(i) and pi(x) < f(i),
xi otherwise,
and, for i ∈ N ,
cM
n
i =
{
1 if i ∈ F (X(x)),
0 otherwise.
Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be an initial decision vector. Note that, for i ∈ V \ {c}, f(i) ∈ {0, 1} and
the in-degree of i is either 0 or 1. Thus, according to the above expressions, for i ∈ V \ {c},
cM
o
i (x) = c
Mn
i (x). This implies that the final decision vectors in M
o and Mn can only differ in
the final decision of c.
When pc(x), qc(x) ≥ f(i), c
Mo
c (x) = 1 but c
Mn
c (x) = xc. When pc(x), qc(x) < f(i), c
Mo
c (x) = 0
but cM
n
c (x) = xc. In all the remaining cases we have c
Mo
c (x) = c
Mn
c (x).
The different final decision of c has relevance only if it implies a change in the final collective
decision, therefore we have to examine only two cases in which a difference can arise.
Case 1 pc(x), qc(x) ≥ f(i) and |F (X(x))| = q.
In this case cMo(x) = 1, thus in the oblivious model c is satisfied only when xc = 1. But,
cMn(x) = xc, thus in the non-oblivious model c is satisfied independently of its initial choice.
Case 2 pc(x), qc(x) < f(i) and |F (X(x))| = q − 1.
In this case cMo(x) = 0, thus in the oblivious model c is satisfied only when xc = 0. But,
cMn(x) = xc, thus in the non-oblivious model c is satisfied independently of its initial choice.
Using the above properties, we can obtain an expression for SatMn(i).
When i 6= C, the final collective decision in both Mo and Mn is independent of the value of
xi. Therefore, SatMn(i) = SatMo(i) = 2
n−1.
For the central vertex c we have,
SatMn(c) =SatMo(c)
+ |{x ∈ {0, 1}n | xc = 0, pc(x), qc(x) ≥ f(c) and |F (X(x))| = q}|
+ |{x ∈ {0, 1}n | xc = 1, pc(x), qc(x) < f(c) and |F (X(x))| = q − 1}|.
It is easy to derive closed formulas for the sizes of the sets appearing in the above expressions.
Therefore, from Theorem 5 the claim follows.
7 Conclusions and open problems
We have introduced collective decision-making models that extend the opinion leader-follower de-
cision models to the setting of influence games. Our gOLF models extend the original model
proposed by van den Brink et al. [22] to include decision rules different from the simple majority
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rule. The rules of influence spread are different for OLF and for influence games. This leads us to
the definition of oblivious and non-oblivious influence models. We have established a connection
between players in an influence game and opinion leaders in the associated decision model.
We have studied the computational complexity of the satisfaction measure proposed by van den
Brink et al. [22] for the new collective decision-making models. We have shown that computing
the satisfaction measure is #P-hard even for the more restrictive family of odd-OLF models. The
problem remains hard when the influence graph is restricted to be a two layered bipartite graph
with constant in-degree. Interestingly enough, the measure coincides with the well established Rae
index that is closely related to the Banzhaf value of the associated simple games. Therefore we have
found another set of simple games with succinct representation in which computing the Banzhaf
value is #P-hard.
To complement the hardness result we have explored the possibility of having models in which
the Satisfaction problem is tractable by making stronger connections among sets of vertices.
We defined two subfamilies of oblivious influence models, the strong hierarchical influence models
and the star influence models in which satisfaction can be computed in polynomial time. The first
family considers multilayered bipartite influence graphs having a hierarchy of mediators moderating
the spread of influence from opinion leaders to followers. In the star influence models we also allow
a restricted form of mutual influence. The result for star influence models can be extended, by a
tedious proof, following the table computation for hierarchical influence graphs, to a more general
version of star influence graphs in which the central vertex is replaced by a set of independent
vertices. Any of those vertices is a replica of the central vertex, thus they keep all the existing
connections of the central vertex to the remaining vertices.
For both strong hierarchical influence models and the star influence models, besides computing
in polynomial time the satisfaction measure we can compute additional information. In particular
we can compute in polynomial time the number of initial decision vectors that expand to k actors
being b of them followers. We can consider a mixed oblivious influence model whose structure is
obtained from an influence graph (G, f) and a strong hierarchical or a star influence graph (G′, f ′)
adding a complete bipartite graph between V (G′) and a set U ⊆ V (G). It is easy to show that
the Fk(L(G
′)∪ I(G′)∪ R(G′)) in a mixed oblivious influence model can be computed in polynomial
time. As the connection is by means of a complete graph only a polynomial number of subsets of
U can be activated. Thus strong hierarchical or star influence graph can be used as mechanism to
control the spread of influence in a generic social network.
Among several problems that remain open we want to point out two that relate directly to
the hardness proof provided in this paper. The first one is the complexity of the Satisfaction
problem for OLF models under the simple majority rule as our reduction does not construct an
odd-OLF with this restriction. Although we conjecture that the problem is hard we have been
unable to straighten the reduction. The second one relates to other aspects of the complexity of
counting independent sets of size 13n. In [9] was shown a stronger result, as the provided reduction
from #3-SAT, give a formula with m clauses, constructs a graph with O(m) vertices in such a
way that the number of satisfying assignments of the original formula coincides with the number of
independent sets of size 13 |V | of the constructed graph. Such property implies that the problem of
computing the number of independent sets with size exactly 23 |V | in a graph is harder, in the sense
that it cannot be solved by a sub-exponential time algorithm, unless the #3-Sat problem can be
solved in sub-exponential time [9]. The graph constructed in our reduction does not have linear
size with respect to the input graph. Hence, we can only deduce that the problem is #P-hard. It
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remains open to show if sub-exponential time algorithms can be also ruled out.
Another line for further work is to study the computational complexity of other measures for
collective decision-making models. In particular the power measure introduced in [22]. The power
of an actor is the number of society’s initial decisions for which that actor can change the collective
decision by changing its initial decision. As the satisfaction measure, the power measure can be
expressed in a form similar to the Rae index, but considering the sets of minimal winning and
maximal losing coalitions, instead of W and L. The satisfaction measure is closely related to the
Chow parameters for simple games [6], but considering also losing coalitions. Chow parameters were
initially defined in the 1960s in the context of threshold Boolean functions [4], and it is known that
their computation, for simple games given by their minimal winning coalitions, is #P-complete [1].
In a similar way, the power measure is related with another power index called the Holler index [2].
It will be of interest to see if the results on this paper can be extended to the computation of those
and other measures.
Finally, let us mention that due to the relationship that we have established between these
models and simple games, all the power indices introduced in the context of simple games can also
be transformed in measures for influence models. It is of interest to analyze which of those power
indices provide interesting measures for decision systems.
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